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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a new Bayesian approach to explain some market
anomalies during nancial crises and subsequent recovery. We assume that the
earnings shock of an asset follows a random walk model with and without drift
to incorporate the impact of nancial crises. We further assume the earning
shock follows an exponential family distribution to take care of symmetric as
well as asymmetric information. By using this model setting, we develop some
properties on the expected earnings shock and its volatility, and establish prop-
erties of investor behavior on the stock price and its volatility during nancial
crises and subsequent recovery. Thereafter, we develop properties to explain
excess volatility, short-term underreaction, long-term overreaction, and their
magnitude eects during nancial crises and subsequent recovery.
KEYWORDS: Bayesian model; representative and conservative heuristics; ex-
cess volatility; underreaction; overreaction; magnitude eects; nancial crises.
JEL classications: C11, G01, G11.
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1 Introduction
There are several papers that have modeled bubbles and crashes. For example, Abreu
and Brunnermeier (2003) use the idea of sequential awareness to develop a theory
in which arbitrageurs compete with each other to beat the gun in a stock market.
Matsushima (2013) extends their work and shows that rational arbitrageurs are willing
to ride the bubble even with incomplete information. He also proves that the bubble
can persist for a long period as the unique nash equilibrium outcome. In this paper,
we examine the problem of bubbles and crashes by using an alternative perspective,
by modeling investor behaviors to ride a bubble during bull and bear markets. The
paper will discuss the traditional and behavioral theory for investment.
Explaining market anomalies, such as market excess volatility, overreaction, and
underreaction, is one of the most important issues in nance. Classical theorists of
market rationality, for example, Fama and French (1996) hypothesize that overre-
action and underreaction can be explained by the ecient market paradigm. On
the other hand, behaviorial economists such as Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (BSV)
(1998) combine psychological phenomena with nance theories to explain market
anomalies, such as the overreaction and underreaction phenomena.
There are several basic assumptions for the traditional asset-pricing model. Vi-
olating the assumptions could result in deviating from the traditional asset-pricing
theory in a typical behavioral model. For example, BSV assume that investors adopt
conservative and representative heuristics, and the earnings announcements satisfy
a random walk following either a trending regime or a mean-reverting regime. This
could be used to explain underreaction and overreaction phenomena. In addition,
Gervais and Odean (2001) argue that insider traders put higher weights on a secu-
rity's dividend if they successfully predict their past performance and use the Bayes
rule to update their prediction.
It has been observed that investors are too conservative and too slow to vary their
prior beliefs when new information arrives. For example, assuming that conserva-
tive investors might not pay great attention to the latest earnings announcements,
Edwards (1968) develops a Bayesian model that put a lower weight on useful sta-
tistical evidence and put greater weight on investors' priors. Nonetheless, Tversky
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and Kahneman (1971), Kahneman and Tversky (1973), and others use the concept of
representative heuristics, namely the bias individuals believe population parameters
to be \represented" in the latest data, in their experimental studies.
Assuming that people overemphasize the strength of the evidence and de-emphasize
its weight when they update their beliefs, Grin and Tversky (1992) develop a model
by combining both conservatism and representativeness. BSV further develop a
Bayesian model to explain investors' behavioral biases by using both conservatism
and representativeness heuristics in making decisions. Lam, Liu, and Wong (LLW)
(2010, 2012) extend their work by introducing a pseudo-Bayesian approach.
In this paper, we modify LLW's pseudo-Bayesian approach by assuming that the
earnings shock of an asset follows a random walk model with and without drift to
incorporate the impact of nancial crises. We also assume earning shocks follow an
exponential family distribution to accommodate symmetric as well as asymmetric
information. By using this model setting, we establish properties on the expected
earnings shock and investor behavior during nancial crises and subsequent recovery.
Thereafter, we establish new results to explain some market anomalies, including
excess volatility, short-term underreaction, long-term overreaction, and their magni-
tude eects during nancial crises and subsequent recovery. For example, the theory
developed in this paper infers that excess volatility is proportional to the variance
of the earnings shock in the long run, excess volatility increases when the discount
rate drops, and conservative (representative) heuristics will decrease (increase) excess
volatility.
For short-term underreaction, long-term overreaction, and their magnitude eects,
we show that there exist both short-term underreaction and long-term overreaction
by using underreaction and/or event approaches. We nd that the expected momen-
tum and contrarian prots are positive when the trading period is long enough. In
addition, the momentum prot and its magnitude eect are higher in the shorter
period, and the contrarian prot and its magnitude eect are higher in the longer pe-
riod. Moreover, the representative (conservative) heuristic will lead to the contrarian
(momentum) prot.
We also show that the representative (conservative) heuristic has to overpower
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the conservative (representative) heuristic to obtain a contrarian (momentum) prot.
Furthermore, both momentum and contrarian prots are shown to be sensitive to the
discount rate, such that the smaller is the discount rate, the larger are the momentum
and contrarian prots. We also nd that the expected momentum and contrarian
prots are positive when the trading period is long enough. All the above ndings
hold regardless of the symmetric/asymmetric information on the signs of the earnings
shock, and hold during nancial crises and during the recovery of the economy. We
explain this phenomenon in the Conclusion.
2 Assumptions and the Model Specication
2.1 Earnings Announcements
The pioneer work of BSV considers a model of market sentiment, in which a repre-
sentative investor believes that the earnings announcement, Nt, of the asset at time
t follows a random walk model, such that:
Nt = Nt 1 + et ; (1)
where et is an earnings shock at time t. Applying the cost-of-capital model (Wong
and Chan, 2004), the price, P, of an asset at time t follows:
Pt = Et

Nt+1
1 + r
+
Nt+2
(1 + r)2
+   

=
Nt
r
+
1 + r
r


Et[et+1]
1 + r
+
Et[et+2]
(1 + r)2
+   

; (2)
in which r is the positive discount rate and Et[] is the conditional expectation, given
the information set 
t. We assume that et is 
t-measurable. Thus, both P and N
are 
t-measurable.
In this paper we extend the theory by assuming that the earnings announcement,
Nt, follows the following random walk model with/without drifts to capture the
impact of a nancial crises:
Nt =
(
0 +Nt 1 + et; t0  t < t1 ;
1 +Nt 1 + et; t1  t < t2 ;
(3)
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in which 0 < 0 and 1 > 0. In equation (??), we consider an economy with two dier-
ent states: economic conditions under nancial crises and conditions under recovery.
We assume that the earnings announcement, Nt, follows a random walk model with
negative drift, 0, when nancial crises starts at time t0, and a random walk with
positive drift, 1, when the economy starts to recover from time t1.
BSV assume that the earnings shock is independent and follows a Bernoulli distri-
bution with equal probability on e0 or  e0. LLW relax this assumption to allow the
earnings shock to follow a normal distribution. In this paper, we relax the assumption
by assuming that the earnings shock follows an exponential family distribution:
et  f(yt) = exp f(et   b())=a() + c(et;)g ; (4)
where  is the canonical parameter, a(> 0); b; and c are known functions, and  is the
dispersion parameter. The dispersion parameter is assumed to be a constant, either
known, or considered as a nuisance parameter.
We note the advantage of using the exponential family distribution is that it is one
of the most commonly used continuous distributions, including the normal, gamma,
and other distributions, and so, it can t into situations with symmetric as well as
asymmetric distributions. This relaxation is very important because it is well known
that market information could be asymmetric. A bear market will be more sensitive
to bad news, while a bull market is more sensitive to good news. There are many
ndings and studies1 in the literature supporting the use of the random walk model
with drifts for earnings announcement.
One may wonder why investors could foresee when (t0) a crisis would start and
when (t1) the crisis would end, when the economy would start recovering, and when
(t2) the recovery would end. It is impossible for any investor to know the exact
dates of t0, t1, and t2. However, there are many well-known cycles, for example, the
Lunar cycle, January eect, Kitchin cycle, presidential election cycle, Juglar cycle,
Kondratie cycle, and other cycles.2 Some smart investors may be able to predict
1See, for example, Thompson and Wong (1996), Chaudhuri and Wu (2003), Ayers, Li, and Yeung
(2011) and the references cited therein.
2See, for example, Wong and McAleer (2009) and the references cited therein for more informa-
tion.
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the cycles well, and so they may be able to predict the intervals into which t0, t1, and
t2 fall.
In addition, we note that t0, t1, and t2 may not be the true dates of the turning
points of the cycles. However, if many investors believe that the market will crash at
t0, they might start selling their stocks and eventually cause the market to crash. This
self-fullling nature leads to the formation of speculative bubbles (see, for example,
Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1992)). In addition, Brunnermeier (2001) notes that
this episode is an example of herding behavior that is irrational and driven by emotion-
greed in the bubbles, fear in nancial crashes, and individual investors join the crowd
of others in a rush to move in or out of the market.
2.2 Pseudo-Bayesian Model
In order to estimate the unknown mean, , of the earnings shock, one could use a
vague priorP0() / 1 and the likelihood function L(e1; e2;    ; etj) =
tQ
i=1
L
 
et i+1j

in the standard and rational Bayesian approach. This leads to obtain the posterior
distribution of  conditional on fe1; e2;    ; etg, such that P
 
 j e1; e2;    ; et

_
tQ
i=1
L
 
et i+1 j 

.3
Using this standard Bayesian approach will derive the theory to support the tra-
ditional ecient market hypothesis and the rational expectation asset-pricing theory
(Friedman, 1979). In this situation, any structural irrationally inducing nancial
anomalies would disappear. However, it is well known that the rational expectations
theory is violated empirically (see, for example, Blume and Easley (1982)). In order
to circumvent the limitation of the traditional Bayesian model, Slovic (1972) suggests
assigning dierent weights to dierent observations. If weights ! := (!1; !2;    ; !t),
LLW propose the following weighted likelihood function:
L!(e1; e2;    ; etj) =
tY
i=1
L
 
et i+1j
!i : (5)
3Readers may refer to Matsumura, Tsui, and Wong (1990) and the references therein cites for
more information about the standard and rational Bayesian approaches. We also note that besides
using the Bayesian approach, there are alternative approaches that could be used to measure in-
vestors' belief; for example, one could use subjective weighting function, as in Levy and Wiener
(1998).
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2.3 Weight Assignment
Assigning general weights on observations enables incorporation of one's prior beliefs
into the sample data to examine the price formation process. Brav and Heaton
(2002) suggest setting the rst half of the weights to one and the second half to
zero. LLW suggest using the weighted likelihood function stated in equation (??)
and assume investors placing the weight !i on the i
th most recent observation, et i,
with 0  !i  1. In this paper, we assume that investors assign the following weights:
0  !1      !m0 = !m0+1 =    = !n0 = 1  !n0+1      0; (6)
for 1  m0 < n0. We note that investors are under the inuence of both conservative
and representative heuristics if they use weights shown in equation (??), conservatism
is obtained when setting m0 > 0, while representativeness is obtained by setting
n0 < 1. Investors will only have conservative heuristics if n0 = 1, and they will
only have representative heuristics if m0 = 0. In addition, if n0 = 1 and m0 = 0,
then all weights will be unity. In this situation, investors will have no behavioral bias.
Thus, investors with heuristics shown in equation (??) could represent all other types
of investors. Thus, we only study investors with heuristics as shown in equation (??)
in this paper.
3 Basic Properties under the Pseudo-Bayesian Ap-
proach
Under the model discussed in Section ??, we rst obtain the following theorem for
the stock price and return:
Theorem 1 Applying the pseudo-Bayesian approach with a vague prior, if Nt
follows the random walk model stated in equation (??) and the likelihood L!() follows
the equation stated in equation (??), for any k  1, then
Et[et+k] =
!te1 +   + !1et
st
:= dt and 
2
t =
2estPt
i=1 !
2
i
; (7)
where st = 
t
i=1!i, Et[et+k] is the predictive mean of the future earning shock, et+k,
and 2t is the posterior variance of  given fe1; e2;    ; etg.
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We provide a proof of Theorem ?? in the Appendix. LLW develop the results of the
rational expectations pricing model in equation (??) when the random walk model is
given in equation (??), whereas FLSW extend LLW's work by developing the results
of the rational expectations pricing model when the random walk model is given in
equation (??). The authors assume that the earnings shock is normally distributed.
In this paper, by applying Theorem ?? and assuming the earnings shock, yt, follows
an exponential family distribution, as stated in equation (??), we extend FLSW's
work to relax the normality assumption and obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 2 Under the assumptions stated in Theorem ?? and using the rational
expectations pricing model, as stated in equation (??),
a. if fNtg follows equation (??), then
Et

Pt+k
(1 + r)k

=
Nt
r(1 + r)k
+
[(1 + k)r + 1]dt
r2(1 + r)k
; and (8)
b. if fNtg follows equation (??), then
Et

Pt+k
(1 + r)k

=
Nt
r(1 + r)k
+
dt[(k + 1)r + 1]
r2(1 + r)k
+8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
0
r2(1+r)bt 2

(r + 1)bt k 2([k + 2  at]r + 1)  1

+ 1
(r+1)ct 2r2
 
(r + 1)ct bt   1 ; t < t0  t+ k < t1
(bt at)0
r(1+r)k
+ 1
r2(1+r)ct 2

(r + 1)ct k 2([k + 2  bt]r + 1)  1

; t < t0; t1  t+ k < t2
(bt at)0+(ct bt)1
r(1+r)k
; t < t0; t2  t+ k
0
r2(1+r)bt 2

(r + 1)bt k 2([k + 1]r + 1)  1+ 1
(r+1)ct 2r2
 
(r + 1)ct bt   1 ; t0  t < t+ k < t1
0(bt 1)
r(1+r)k
+ 1
(r+1)ct 2r2
 
(r + 1)ct k 2([k + 2  bt]r + 1)  1

; t0  t < t1  t+ k < t2
0(bt 1)+1(ct bt)
r(1+r)k
; t0  t < t1; t2  t+ k
1
(r+1)ct 2r2
 
(r + 1)ct 2 k([k + 1]r + 1)  1 ; t1  t < t+ k < t2
1(ct 1)
r(1+r)k
; t1  t < t2  t+ k
(9)
where Pt is the price at time t, at = maxfdt0   te ; 0g, bt = maxfdt1   te ; 0g,
ct = maxfdt2   te ; 0g, and dt = !te1++!1etst .
From Theorem ??, the current earnings announcement depends on the predictive
mean of the future earning shocks, the current earnings announcement, the risk-free
interest rate, the duration of the economic recovery or downturn, and the recovery
rate of the economy or the deteriorating rate under nancial crises.
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4 Inference on Market Volatility
According to Theorem ??, whichever proess the random walk fNtg follows, we
have Et[Pt+k] = Nt=r + [r(1 + k) + 1]dt=r2 + ck, where ck may vary, as described
in Theorem 2. For Pt, we obtain Pt = Nt=r + (r + 1)dt=r2 + c0 and Pt+1 =
Nt+1=r + (r + 1)dt+1=r2 + c1, where c0 and c1 are constants, and may dier in value.
Consequently, for the 1-period return Rt;t+1 =Pt+1  Pt:
Rt;t+1 =
1 + r
r2

!t+1
st+1
  !t
st

e1 +   +

!2
st+1
  !1
st

et

+

1
r
+
1 + r
r2
!1
st+1

et+1
+c1   c0:
From this result, we obtain the following theorem that may be used to draw inferences
regarding market volatility:
Theorem 3 Under the assumptions stated in Theorem ??:
a. if st !1, then market volatility Var(Rt;t+1)! 2e=r2;
b. if there is severe behavioral bias, that is, st ! s1 <1, then the market volatility
Var(Rt;t+1) becomes:h 1
r2
+ 2
1
r
1 + r
r2
s1
s1
i
2y +
(1 + r)2
r4
1
s21
A12e ; (10)
where A1 = !21 +
P1
t=1(!t+1   !t)2:
In addition, applying Theorem ?? enables us to obtain some interesting observa-
tions on excess volatility, as stated in the following property:
Property 4 Under the assumptions stated in Theorem ??, we have:
a. Excess volatility is proportional to the variance of the earnings shock in the long
run;
b. If the discount rate and/or investors' anticipated return, r, increases, then the
excess volatility will be reduced;
c. Conservative (representative) heuristics will decrease (increase) excess volatility;
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d. Parts a to c hold regardless of the symmetric/asymmetric information on the
signs of the earnings shock;
e. Parts a to c hold during nancial crises and during recovery.
Property ??a could be obtained by applying Part a of Theorem ??. One could
obtain Property ??b by conducting simple computations. We provide some remarks
for Properties ??c and ??d as follows: If investors adopt a conservative heuristic,
then they will choose a positive integer, m0, and assign the following weights: 0 
!1 <    < !m0 = !m0+1 =    = 1. This leads to st ! 1, and excess volatility
Var(Rt;t+1)! 2e=r2. On the other hand, if investors select a representative heuristic,
they will choose a positive integer, n0, and assign weights 1 = !1 =    = !n0 >
!n0+1 >     0. In this situation, if the behavioral biases are severe, then the !i are
close to 0 for any i > n0 and st ! s1 <1. Thus, the excess volatility will appear in
the form of equation (??) and can be larger than that in the conservative heuristic
case.
For the third case, investors adopt both conservative and representative heuristics,
and so they will choose both m0 and n0, such that 1  m0  n0, and assign the
following weights: 0  !1 <    < !m0 = !m0+1 =    = !n0 = 1 > !n0+1 >     0.
Their market volatility will be larger than in the conservative heuristic case, but
smaller than in the representative heuristic case. If the !i are very close to zero for
any i, with n0 < i and i < m0, then st ! s1 < 1, and consequently, the excess
volatility will also appear in the form of equation (??). In this situation, the excess
volatility will be greater than 2e=r
2. However, when compared with the representative
heuristic, as 0  !1 < 1, the terms A1 and s1=s1 will be smaller than those in the
representative heuristic case, and so will reduce the excess volatility. We will discuss
Properties ??e and 4f in the Conclusion.
5 Inferences on Underreaction and Overreaction
In order to examine the underreaction and overreaction phenomena, we dene the
lag-one autocovariance, k1 , of the k-period return as 
k
1 = Cov(Rt;t+k;Rt;t k), where
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Rt;t+k is the k-period return and Rt;t k is the k-period return from time t k to time
t. The lag-one autocorrelation, k1, of the k-period return is given as:
k1 =
Cov(Rt;t+k;Rt;t k)p
Var(Rt;t+k)Var(Rt;t k)
: (11)
As underreaction (overreaction) is associated with positive (negative) autocorre-
lation, this leads to the following denition:
Denition 1 An asset displays:
a. a short-term underreaction if k1 > 0 for suciently small k;
b. a long-term overreaction if k1 < 0 for suciently large k;
where k1 is dened in equation (??).
Based on the above denition, we establish the following theorem:
Theorem 5 Under the assumptions stated in Theorem ??, if investors possess
weights as stated in equation (??) and if there is severe behavioral bias, then there
exist short-term underreaction and long-term overreaction exhibited as return auto-
correlations. That is, there are positive integers K1 and K2:
k1 > 0 k  K1;
k1 < 0 k > K2;
(12)
for large t, where k1 is dened in equation (??). In addition, the limiting correlation
coecients stated in equation (??) are not zero. The results hold regardless of the
symmetric/asymmetric information on the signs of the earnings shock, and during
nancial crises and recovery.
The proof of Theorem ?? is given in the Appendix. We note that it is natural that
the results in equation (??) hold for the symmetric as well as asymmetric information
on the signs of the earnings shock and during nancial crises and recovery. For
example, during a crash it is generally common for stock prices to fall day after day.
This is exactly what is shown in Theorem ??: that k1 > 0 for k  K1 for some
small integers K1; this condition also holds during recovery. On the other hand,
during nancial crises, one would expect the market to recover after some time; this
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is shown in Theorem ??: that k1 < 0 for k > K2 for some large values K2. Similarly,
during a recovery, one would expect that a recession could arise in the future; this is
also shown in Theorem ??: that k1 < 0 for k > K2 for some large values K2. Similar
arguments hold true for the asymmetric information on the signs of the earnings
shock. For example, bad news arriving after bad news will result in a further decline
in stock price. This is shown in Theorem ?? where k1 > 0 for k  K1 for small integer
K1.
We now adopt the event approach used by BSV to describe underreaction and
overreaction. It is well known that stock prices can be higher after the company
announces good news rather than bad news. However, stock prices can also lower.
The market is said to be underreacting in the former situation, and overreacting in the
latter situation. We follow the approach used by BSV to quantify such underreaction
and overreaction by dening the dierence in expected returns after a string of good
or bad news, as follows:
Ut(s; j) = EfRt+1jet > + se;    ; et j+1 > + seg
 EfRt+1jet <   se;    ; et j+1 <   seg; (13)
where s is the intensity of the content of news and j is the time length of the string
of good or bad news. The term Ut(s; j) ( Ut(s; j)), dened in equation (??) is the
expected prot of a momentum (contrarian) trading strategy that dictates buying
(selling) when there is a string of good news, and selling (buying) when there is a
string of bad news. We can use the sign of Ut(s; j) to measure underreaction and
overreaction, as stated in the following denition:
Denition 2
a. For a suciently small j, if Ut(s; j) > 0, then there exists a short-term under-
reaction in price;
b. for a suciently large j, if Ut(s; j) < 0, then there exists a long-term overreac-
tion in price.
Using Denition ??, we establish the following theorem:
Theorem 6 Under the assumptions stated in Theorem ??:
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a. There are short-term underreactions and long-term overreactions in price when
an event approach is used. That is, for a given s > 0 and for large t, there exist
integers J1 and J2 such that:
Ut(s; j) > 0; j  J1;
Ut(s; j) < 0; j  J2; (14)
where Ut(s; j) is dened in equation (??).
b. When t ! 1, the expected momentum (contrarian) trading prot, Ut(s; j)
( Ut(s; j)), is positive for j  J1 (j  J2).
c. In addition, the results in (a) and (b) above hold regardless of the symmet-
ric/asymmetric information on the signs of the earnings shock.
d. The results in (a) and (b) above hold during nancial crises and during recovery.
We provide the proof of Theorem ?? in the Appendix. From Theorems ?? and ??
and their proofs, we obtain the following property for underreaction and overreaction:
Property 7 Under the assumptions stated in Theorem ??, we have:
a. There exist short-term underreactions and long-term overreactions in price when
underreaction and/or event approaches are used, and both expected momentum
and contrarian prots are positive when the trading period is long enough.
b. The representative (conservative) heuristic contributes to the contrarian (mo-
mentum) prot.
c. Overreaction (underreaction) occurs after long (short) periods of good or bad
nancial performance.
d. The representative (conservative) heuristic has to overpower the conservative
(representative) heuristic to obtain a contrarian (momentum) prot to surface.
e. The larger is the discount rate, the smaller are the momentum and contrarian
prots, and vice-versa.
f. Observations a-e above hold for asymmetric as well as symmetric information
on the signs of the earnings shock, and during nancial crises and recovery.
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6 Inference on the Magnitude Eect
If the momentum (contrarian) prot Ut(s; j) (-Ut(s; j)) increases as s or j increases,
prots possess a magnitude eect in s or j. The following theorems state the magni-
tude eect for investors using both conservative and representative heuristics.
Theorem 8 Under the assumptions stated in Theorem ??, there exists a magni-
tude eect in s for both long-term overreaction and short-term underreaction that was
established in Theorem ??. That is, there exist integers J1 and J2 such that:
a. The momentum (contrarian) prot Ut(s; j) ( Ut(s; j) ) is positive and strictly
increases with s for any suciently small (large) t and for any j < J1 (j > J2).
b. The result of the momentum and contrarian prots stated in (a) above hold
regardless of the symmetric/asymmetric information on the signs of the earnings
shock.
c. The result of the momentum and contrarian prots stated in (a) above hold
during nancial crises and recovery.
Theorem 9 Under the assumptions stated in Theorem ??:
a. For suciently small (large) j, the momentum (contrarian) prot based on j
consecutive good or bad news increases as j decreases (increases).
b. The result of the momentum and contrarian prots stated in (a) above hold
regardless of the symmetric/asymmetric information on the signs of the earnings
shock.
c. The result of the momentum and contrarian prots stated in (a) above hold
during nancial crises and recovery.
We give the proof of Theorem ?? in the Appendix. The proof of Theorem ?? can be
easily obtained thereafter. We summarize the results in Theorems ?? and ?? in the
following property on the magnitude eect:
Property 10 Under the assumptions stated in Theorem ??:
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a. There exist positive momentum and contrarian prots with magnitude eect
such that the more does the stock price uctuates:
i. the higher is the momentum prot and its magnitude eect in a short
period;
ii. the higher is the contrarian prot and its magnitude eect in a long period.
b. There exist positive contrarian prots with magnitude eect such that:
i. the higher is the momentum prot and its magnitude eect if the good/bad
news come in the shorter period of time;
ii. the higher is the contrarian prot and its magnitude eect if the good/bad
news come in the longer period of time.
c. When the stock price uctuates more, the momentum prot is positive and
monotonic for smaller time periods, while the contrarian prot is positive and
monotonic for longer periods.
d. Findings a to c above hold regardless of the symmetric/asymmetric information
on the signs of the earnings shock, and hold during nancial crises and recovery.
7 Concluding Remarks
BSV and others have established Bayesian models to combine psychological phe-
nomena with nance theories to explain market anomalies, such as the overreaction
and underreaction phenomena. In this paper, we modied the Bayesian approach
to explain market anomalies, including excess volatility, short-term underreaction,
long-term overreaction, and their magnitude eects during nancial crises and sub-
sequent recovery. It was assumed that: (1) investors exhibit both conservative and
representative heuristics that lead them to underweigh recent observations and past
observations of the earnings shocks of corporations; (2) the earnings shock of an asset
follows a modied random walk model with and without drift, and with an expo-
nential family distribution to incorporate the impact of nancial crises; and (3) the
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likelihood function for earning shocks of the stock in a Bayesian paradigm is weighted
by investors' behavioral biases.
By using this model setting, we establish properties on the expected earnings shock
and it associated volatility. We then established some new results to explain market
anomalies, including excess volatility, short-term underreaction, long-term overreac-
tion, and their magnitude eects during nancial crises and subsequent recovery.
We noted that the ndings in this paper on excess volatility, short-term under-
reaction, long-term overreaction, and their magnitude eects hold regardless of the
symmetric/asymmetric information on the signs of the earnings shock, and hold dur-
ing nancial crises and recovery. One may believe that dierent market situations
and dierent shapes of the earnings shock should lead to dierent results. We have
illustrated this property for overreaction and underreaction after Theorem ??. We
now illustrate this property for excess volatility. One may think that during a market
crash, excess volatility would increase sharply. However, Properties ??d and ??e show
this is not the case.
We note that this does not mean that dierent market situations and dierent
shapes of the earnings shock have no eect on excess volatility. These observations
only show that the eects of dierent market situations and dierent shapes of the
earnings shock are already reected in the use of dierent heuristics. It does have an
eect on excess volatility. For example, when the market is going to crash, investors
realize that they could lose most of their investment if they do not sell their stocks.
This means that investors will emphasize the recent observations more, and so they
select representative heuristics. In this situation, from Property ??c, excess volatility
is increasing. Thus, the theory developed from the model could also be used to explain
the empirical situation.
The theory developed in this paper could be used to explain investor behaviors in
making decisions about nancial investments. One may incorporate other informa-
tion, for example, the economic and nancial environment (Fong, Lean, and Wong,
2008), the mean-variance rule (Wong and Ma, 2008; Bai, Hui, Wong, and Zitikis,
2012), CAPM statistics (Leung, Ng and Wong, 2012), VaR rule (Ma and Wong,
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2010), portfolio optimization (Bai, Liu, and Wong, 2009), and portfolio diversica-
tion (Egozcue and Wong, 2010) into the theory developed in the paper to make better
investment decisions.
There are some other theories that explain the behavior of investors. For example,
Levy, Levy, and Solomon (1994, 2000) introduce the concepts of rational informed
identical (RII) investors. They document that RII investors believe that the stock
price may deviate from the fundamental value in the short run but, if it does, it will
eventually converge to the fundamental value. On the other hand, the EMBs believe
that the stock price accurately reects the stock's fundamental value.
Wong and Li (1999), Wong (2007), and others extend stochastic dominance theory
to obtain some properties for risk averters and risk seekers. Based on the empirical
study on momentum prot, Fong, Wong, and Lean (2005) conclude that risk averters
prefer to invest in winner portfolios, while Sriboonchitta, Wong, Dhompongsa, and
Nguyen (2009) nd that risk seekers prefer to invest in loser portfolios. This nding
could explain why the momentum prot could still exist after discovery. In addition,
Qiao, Clark, and Wong (2012) examine the Taiwan spot and futures markets, and
conclude that risk averters prefer to invest in the spot market, whereas risk seekers
prefer to invest in the futures market. Hoang, Wong, and Zhu (2015) nd that the
preference of risk-averse and risk-seeking investors are dierent in the investment of
portfolios with and without gold.
Finally, we note that there are several directions to extend the theory developed
in this paper. One area of extension is to develop test statistics for the ndings
obtained in the paper for dierent types of investors. Recently, Fabozzi et al. (2013)
have introduced statistics to test for the magnitude eect of the overreaction and
underreaction hypotheses. Bai et al. (2015) have developed tests to compare the
preferences of assets for risk averters and risk seekers. Bai et al. (2011) have developed
tests to compare the preferences of assets for investors with S-shaped and reversed S-
shaped utility functions. One could incorporate their ideas to develop some statistics
to test the ndings obtained in the paper for dierent types of preferences of assets
and utility functions.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem ??:
Given that:
P
 
 j e1;    ; et

_
tY
i=1
L
 
et i+1 j 
!i = tY
i=1
exp
n!i(et i+1   b())
a()
+ !ic(et;)
o
;
(15)
the log-likelihood function is:
l(e; ) =
tX
i=1
n!i(et i+1   b())
a()
+ !ic(et;)
o
: (16)
Consequently, it follows that:
@l(e; )
@
=
tX
i=1
n!i(et i+1   b0())
a()
o
;
@2l(e; )
@2
=
tX
i=1
 b00()
a()
:
As E(@l(e;)
@
) = 0 and  E(@2l(e;)
@2
) = E(@l(e;)
@
2
), we can prove Theorem ?? through
simple calculations.
Proof of Theorem ??:
Given that:
Rt;t+1 =
1 + r
r2
!t+1
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  !t
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
e1 +   +
 !2
st+1
  !1
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
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
+
1
r
+
1 + r
r2
!1
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
et+1
+c1   c0 ;
we have:
Var(Rt;t+1) =
1 + r
r2
2 !t+1
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  !t
st
2
+   +
 !2
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  !1
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2
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1
r
+
1 + r
r2
!1
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2
2e
=
 1
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2
+
!t+1
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  !t
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2
+   +
 !2
st+1
  !1
st
2
2e : (17)
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For the case with st ! 1, as !i  1 for every i, we obtain !ist ! 0. As a result, in
this case, Var(Rt;t+1)! 1r22e :
When st ! s1 < 1, the result stated in Theorem ?? can be obtained directly
from equation (??).
Proof of Theorem ??:
Applying Theorem ??, we obtain:
Pt+k =
Nt+k
r
+
(r + 1)dt+k
r2
+ c+k ;
Pt k =
Nt k
r
+
(r + 1)dt k
r2
+ c k ;
where c+k and c
 
k are constants and may dier, as stated in Theorem ??. As a result,
we obtain the following for the k-period return:
Rt;t+k =
1
r
+
(r + 1)!k
r2st+k

et+1 +   +
1
r
+
(r + 1)!1
r2st+k

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!t+k
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  !t
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
e1 +   
!k+1
st+k
  !1
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
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
+ c+k   c0 ;
Rt;t k =
1
r
+
(r + 1)!k+2
r2st

yt k+1 +   +
1
r
+
(r + 1)!1
r2st

et
+
r + 1
r2
!t
st
  !t k
st k

e1 +   
!k+1
st
  !1
st k

et k

+ c0   c k :
As ei are independent and identically distributed, we obtain:
Cov(Rt;t+k;Rt;t k) =
!t+k
st+k
  !t
st
!t
st
  !t k
st k

+   +
!2k+1
st+k
  !k+1
st
!k+1
st
  !1
st k


r + 1
r2
2
2e :
When the investor has severe behavioral biases, that is st ! s1 < 1, the sign of
!2k+i
st+k
  !k+i
st

!k+i
st
  !i
st k

; i = 1;    ; t   k, is determined by the sign of (!2k+i  
!k+i)(!k+i !i). If investors possess both conservative and representative heuristics,
then they assign weights as 0  !1 <    < !m0 = !m0+1 =    = !n0 = 1 > !n0+1 >
    0 for 1  m0  n0.
When k is small, the sign of (!2k+i !k+i) is the same as that of (!k+i  !i). For
instance, when i = 1, 2k + 1 < n0, (!2k+1   !k+1) > 0, and (!k+1   !1) > 0 hold
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simultaneously. In addition, we have (!t+k   !t) < 0 and (!t   !t k) < 0. Thus, we
obtain Cov
 
Rt;t+k;Rt;t k

> 0 for k < K1, where K1 is a constant.
Similarly, when k is large, the sign of (!2k+i   !k+i) will generally be opposite
to that of (!k+i   !i). For instance, if m0 < k + 1 < n0 and 2k + 1 > n0, then
(!2k+1   !k+1) < 0 and (!k+1   !1) > 0 hold simultaneously. On the other hand,
when t   k > n0, though (!t+k   !t) < 0 and (!t   !t k) < 0 still hold, this term
is negligible. Recall the assumption that st ! s1 < 1, which infers that !t ! 0.
Thus, we obtain Cov
 
Rt;t+k;Rt;t k

< 0 for k > K2, where K2 is a constant.
Proof of Theorem ??:
Let Z = et 
e
;D1(s) = E
 
Z jZ > s, and D2(s) = E Z jZ <  s. Applying
Lemma 1 in LLW, we have:
E
h
Rt+1jet > + se;    ; et j+1 > + se
i
=
1 + r
r2
e
h Kt
stst+1
+(t; j)D1(s)
i
+ c1   c0 ;
E
h
Rt+1jet <   se;    ; et j+1 <   se
i
=
1 + r
r2
e
h Kt
stst+1
+(t; j)D2(s)
i
+ c1   c0 ;
where Kt =

e
[ r
r+1
]stst+1 and (t; j) =
sj+1 s1
st+1
  sj
st
: Consequently, we obtain:
Ut(s; j) =
1 + r
r2
e(t; j)
 
D1(s) D2(s)

:
Obviously, D1(s) > 0 and D2(s) < 0. As a result, the sign of Ut(s; j) depends on the
sign of (t; j) =
sj+1 s1
st+1
  sj
st
. As st ! s1 <1, when t is suciently large, the sign
of (t; j) is determined by the sign of sj+1  s1  sj = !j  !1. When j is very small,
the conservative heuristic guarantees that !1 < !j, so that Ut(s; j) > 0 for j < J1.
On the other hand, when j is large enough, !j can be arbitrarily small because of the
assumption that st ! s1 <1. Consequently, we have !1 > !j, so that Ut(s; j) < 0
for j > J2.
Proof of Theorem ??:
Let h(s) = + se and g(s) =   se, so that:
D1(s) =
R1
h(s)
yf(y)dyR1
h(s)
f(y)dy  e
  
e
;
D2(s) =
R g(s)
0
yf(y)dyR g(s)
0
f(y)dy  e
  
e
:
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This leads to
D 01(s) =
f(h(s))h0(s)
h R1
h(s)
yf(y)dy   h(s) R1
h(s)
f(y)dy
i
  R1
h(s)
f(y)dy
2  e
=
f(h(s))h0(s)
R1
h(s)
f(y)dy
 
   h(s)  R1
h(s)
f(y)dy
2  e ;
where h(s) <  < 1, and the last equation follows from applying the mean value
theorem of integrals. Thus, we have D 01(s) > 0.
By using a similar argument, we obtain:
D 02(s) =
f(g(s))g0(s)
h
g(s)
R g(s)
0
f(y)dy   R g(s)
0
yf(y)dy
i
  R g(s)
0
f(y)dy
2  e
=
f(g(s))g0(s)
R g(s)
0
f(y)dy
 
g(s)    R g(s)
0
f(y)dy
2  e ;
where 0 <  < g(s). We note that g0(s) =  e < 0, so that D 02(s) < 0. Conse-
quently, based on this result, and by using an argument similar to that in Theorem
??, Theorem ?? is obtained.
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